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INTRODUCTION
Successful environmental management and regulation depends on
compatibility between scientific facts and law. However, as the century
of Albert Einstein and Max Planck draws to a close, the relationship
between science' and law remains as uneasy and remote as ever,
especially in the courtroom. One reason for this schism is that science
and law use different tools and methodologies to pursue distinctly
different goals. Furthermore, both science and law are large and
complex fields, and one requires extensive training and many years of
post-graduate experience before one can acquire the skill, knowledge,
and experience that are necessary to become sufficiently fluent in the
professional culture' to understand the tools, methodologies, assump-
tions and contingencies3 that define the professional practices and
procedures in the fields.
Another problem is that the information transfer between science
and law has become the focus of a power struggle within the judicial,4
Science is "knowledge attained through study or practice," Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary. This use is consistent with the REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, infra
note 11.
2 Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and Politics. 11 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 1-46 (1994).
Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 77
JUDICATURE 77(6) (Sept.-Oct. 1993).
4 William L. Foster, Expert Testimony. Prevalent complaints and proposed remedies, 11
HARV L. REV. 169,169-186 (1897).
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legal,' scientific, 6 scientific policy,7 and political communities,' and
other parties whose primary interest is not necessarily to facilitate
communication, but to influence the formulation of legal rules, or to
serve as intermediaries between the court and the parties.
Many authors have discussed whether justice and judicial efficiency
would be improved if the courts would more often use Federal Rules of
Evidence 706 to appoint so-called "neutral" or "non-partisan" experts,9
and the federal courts have recently started to make procedural changes
that address this problem.
This Article uses the role of the causation expert as an example for
analyzing the nature of some of the difficulties encountered in informa-
tion transfer between science and law, for determining what steps might
be useful to assist the judiciary, the litigating attorneys and their parties
in finding better solutions to disputes involving scientific issues.
I. THE ROLE OF THE EXPERT WITNESS
A. The Federal Rules of Evidence
The use of experts as sources and translators of specialized
knowledge dates back to the 14th century."0 The Federal rules of
evidence are derived from a long tradition and require that an expert
s 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 760 (J.H. Chadbourn ed.,
1985).
Arthur Kantrowitz, Elitism vs. Checks and Balances in Communicating Scientific
Information to the Public, in 4 RISK: ISSUES IN HEALTH & SAFETY 101, 101 (Spring 1993); John
Horgan, High Profile: The Simpson Case Raises the Issue of DNA Reliability, Sc1. AM. 33, 36 (Oct.
1994).
. Lee Loevinger, Science as Evidence, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 153, 153-190 (1995); SHEILA
JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA, (Harvard
University Press (1995)) [hereinafter SCIENCE ATTHE BAR]. See generally CARNEGIE COMMISSION
ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING:
CREATING OPPORTUNITIES AND MEETING CHALLENGES (1993) [hereinafter CARNEGIE COMMISSION
ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY].
' MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN
THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 90-110 (1996); PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE
IN THE COURTROOM 18 (1991).
FED.R.EVID. 706; Joe S. Cecil, Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed Experts, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, 524-25 (Federal Judicial Center, 1994); Tahirih V.
Lee, Court-Appointed Experts and Judicial Reluctance: A Proposal to Amend Rule 706 of the
FRE, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 480,480-503 (1988); Wigmore, supra note 5, at 760.
10 Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15
HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 (1901).
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possess special skills.1 ' Fed Rules of Evidence 702 traces back to 1937
and provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.I2
Whether expert testimony is useful is determined by the common
sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to
determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular
issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized under-
standing of the subject involved in the dispute. 3 Expert opinions are
excluded where they are unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a
waste of time. 4
Federal Rules of Evidence 703-Bases for Expert Opinion, states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or
made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence. '
5
Facts or data upon which expert opinions are based may be derived
from three sources. The first is the firsthand observation of the witness,
with opinions based thereon. The second source, presentation at the
trial, may be a hypothetical question or having the expert attend the trial
and hear the testimony establishing the facts. The third source consists
of presentation of data to the expert outside of court and other than by
his own perception.
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give
reasons therefor without first testifying to the underlying facts or data,
" Schultz v. United States, 2 Ct. Cl. 364, 380-382 (1866).
"2 FED.R.EV.702. According to Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, "opinion" is a belief
stronger than impression and less strong than positive knowledge. Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary (8th ed. 1981).
'3 Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414,418(1952).
14 1 Wigmore, supra note5, § 1918.
11 FED.R.EVID.703.
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unless the court requires otherwise.16 The expert may in any event be
required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. 7
However, the use of hypothetical question has been the target of a
great deal of criticism as encouraging partisan bias, affording an
opportunity for summing up in the middle of the case, and as complex
and time-consuming."8 While the rule allows counsel to make disclo-
sure of the underlying facts or data as a preliminary to the giving of an
expert opinion, if he chooses, the instances in which he is required to do
so are reduced. This is true whether the expert bases his opinion on data
furnished him at secondhand or observed by him at firsthand.
B. The Daubert Standard for Admissibility of Expert Testimony
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court formulated Daubert v. Merrill
Dow Pharmaceutical,19for the purpose of evaluating novel scientific
evidence, and overruled Frye v. United States,20 which had dominated
during the preceding fifty years. However, the Court decided Daubert
on statutory rather than constitutional grounds, and, consequently, each
State remains free to fashion its own standard for admitting scientific
evidence. As of 1995, some 22 States remained committed to Frye.
Daubert changed the focus from cross-examination by counsel
followed by a jury decision to scrutiny by the judge, in essence making
the court the "gatekeeper" as to who is qualified to testify and what
testimony was admissible. In essence, the trial judge's focus is to
ensure that all scientific evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable.
The Daubert standard is more flexible than Frye. It requires that
expert testimony be "reasonably reliable" and "substantially assist" the
6 Edmund M. Morgan, FOREWORD TO THE ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 34 (1942) (citing
Wigmore who opposed this rule as shown by his statement: "It has done more than any one rule
of procedure to reduce our litigation towards a state of legalized gambling.").
'7 FED.R.EVID. 705-Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion.
I 1 Wigmore, supra note 5, at 426-27 (citing Ladd, supra note 15).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), remanded and afd, 43 F.3d
1311 (9th Cir. 1995). The Daubert standard for determining admissibility requires the court to
conduct a two pronged analysis; the court must first determine whether the expert testimony reflects
scientific knowledge, constitutes good science and was derived by scientific methods, and second
must ensure that the proposed testimony "fits" or is relevant to the task at hand in that it logically
advances material aspects of the proposing party's case. Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F.
Supp. 1387, 1396 (D. Or. 1996).
20 Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (required general acceptance of the
scientific premises on which the testimony was based).
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fact-finder. The rule requires that the court reject testimony that is
based upon premises lacking any significant support and acceptance
within the scientific community, or that otherwise would be only
marginally helpful to the fact-finder. In civil cases the court is
authorized and expected under revised Rule 26(c)(4) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to impose in advance of trial appropriate
restrictions on the use of expert testimony. In exercising this responsi-
bility, the court should not only consider the potential admissibility of
the testimony under Rule 702 but also weigh the need and utility of the
testimony against the time and expense.
The decision whether the proffered testimony will substantially
assist the trier of fact, and whether the witness has sufficient expertise
to express such opinions, is governed by Federal Rules of Evidence
104(a) and is a question for the court."
C. Should Experts Serve the Parties or the Court?
Traditionally, experts have been selected by the parties, and testify
in behalf of the parties, but court discretion to select its own expert or
appoint experts upon stipulation or proposal by the parties goes back for
many decades and has been virtually undisputed.22
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party
enter an order of show cause why expert witnesses should not
be appointed, and may request the parties to submit nomina-
tions. The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon
by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own
selection. An expert witness shall not be appointed by the
court unless the witness consents to act. A witness so ap-
pointed shall be informed of the witness' duties by the court in
writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a
conference in which the parties shall have opportunity to
participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of
the witness' findings, if any; the witness' deposition may be
taken by any party; and the witness may be called to testify by
the court or any party. The witness shall be subject to
cross-examination by each party, including a party calling the
21 See, e.g., Hall v. Baxter, 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1395 (D.Or. 1996).
22 1 Wigmore, supra note 5, § 563; 9 Wigmore, supra note 5, § 2484.
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witness.23
While the Federal rules do not describe the expert as being neutral,
the practice of calling court appointed expert "independent," or
"neutral" is widespread and old.24
Court appointed experts are widely used in proceedings to deter-
mine the competence of parties. In child custody cases the right of the
court to appoint its own experts is virtually undisputed, and the
appointment of experts in criminal proceedings for indigents has been
formalized since 1947. However, until recently, it was not common to
use court appointed experts in other civil cases. There has been a
controversy over the usefulness of court appointed scientific experts2"
and courts have been hesitant to use them.26
In the civil law countries of Europe, the selection of expert is
always made by the court as part of its investigation of the case.27 Rules
of the Supreme Court of England have provided for court appointed
experts since 1965,8 and the Canadian Provinces of Canada adopted
similar rules in 1965.29
Proponents of court appointed experts claim that when the evidence
relates to highly technical matters and each side has shopped for experts
favorable to its position, it is naive to expect the jury to be capable of
assessing the credibility of experts.3" Furthermore, contradictory
testimony by experts leaves an evidentiary gap.3' This complaint is not
new. It has been discussed for more than one-hundred years,32 and has
been recognized by the advisory committee which stated that the
practice of shopping for experts, the venality of some experts, and the
23 FED.R.EvID. 706-Court Appointed Experts (a) Appointment.
24 See NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION, IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY: A REPORT
(1956). [hereinafter IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY].
2' Schuck, supra note 2, at 2.
26 Cecil, supra note 9, at 524.
21 See THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURES OF GERMANY OF JANUARY 30, 1877 AND THE
INTRODUCTORY ACT FOR THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES OF JANUARY 30, 1877, As OF
JANUARY 1988 (Engl. trans. by S. L. Gosen, Rothman Publishers 1990).
21 RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT (of England) Order 40, Rules 1-6 (1965), I.H. JACOBS,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 598 (1973).
29 2 JOHN HENRY WIOMoRE, EXPERIENTIAL CAPACITY § 563 (1986).
11 M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 706[011(1985). See Honorable Jack B. Weinstein,
Address entitled The Role of Expert Testimony and Novel Scientific Evidence in the Proof of
Causation, at the ABA Annual Meeting (Aug. 7, 1987).
" Lee, supra note 9, at 488.
32 Foster, supra note 4, at 169.
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reluctance of many reputable experts to involve themselves in litigation,
has been a matter of deep concern."
Opponents of court appointed experts point out that such experts
acquire an aura of infallibility to which they are not entitled,34 that the
primary problem with contradictory experts is pride of opinion and
professional rivalry,35 that the court is not necessarily in a better position
to find a qualified expert than the parties,36 and that the credibility of
experts does not guarantee their competence.
The current discussion over the use of neutral experts reflects a
wide and widely publicized disenchantment with the current civil
litigation system. Some judges are disappointed with the conception of
accuracy of knowledge37 and feel that scientific experts are too
powerful, and that issues take up too much time. Engineers,38
scientists, 39 and policy analysts,4 on the other hand, have long criticized
the unpredictability of the outcome of litigation, the frequent inconsis-
tency between scientific facts and the finding of facts by judges, and the
inconsistency of jury decisions with established scientific fact.4
Scientists are often startled by the blatantly circular legal reasoning.42
Finally, defendants, and some courts believe that science and the expert
3 NOTES OF ADvIsoRY COMMITTEE ON RULES, 56 F.R.D. 183,286(1971).
E lwood S. Levy, Impartial Medical Testimony-Revisited, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 416,424 (1961).
35 Foster, supra note 4, at 184-85.
Schuck, supra note 2, at 11.
3 1 Wigmore, supra note 5, §563. "Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite
misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing
possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 exercises more control over experts than
over lay witnesses." 138 F.R.D. at 632 (year).
3 Huber, supra note 8, at 1-10.
3' Daniel E. Koshland, Editorial, Scientific Evidence in Court, 266 SCIENCE 1787, 1787
(1994).
o See, e.g., Philip H. Abelson, Editorial, Toxic Terror: Phantom Risks, 261 SCIENCE 407,
407 (1993); Philip H. Abelson, Editorial, Pathological Growth of Regulations, 260 SCIENCE 1859,
1859 (1993); Philip H. Abelson, Editorial, Risk Assessment of Low Level Exposures, 206 SCIENCE
1507, 1507 (1994). Letters responding to this editorial were published at 266 SCIENCE 1141, 1141-
45 (1994).
41 Francisco Ayala & Bert Black, Science and the Courts, 81 Am. SCI. 230, 230-39 (1993)
(discussing Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 442 (Cal. App. 1946), a paternity case in which a jury
ordered Chaplin to pay alimony even though blood tests showed that he was not the father).
42 Teachers of common law like to use the following examples: A defendant is liable
because he owes a duty of care, and he owes a duty of care because he is liable. The occupier of
land has a right to exclusive possession because he has a leasehold estate, and he has a leasehold
estate because he has the right to exclusive possession. See, e.g., Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine
Gibson, (EDC) in TORT THEORY: ACTION THEORY AND LEGAL REASONING 5-7 (1993).
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system are responsible for run-away juries and excessive jury awards.
43
In short, there is a widespread belief that change is in order.
II. CAUSATION EXPERTS
The outcome of civil litigation in environmental, product liability
and injury cases frequently depends on whether the plaintiff can prove
a causal link between his injury and the defendant's act, actor, agent or
a toxic source.
A. Toxic Causation
In a toxic injury case, the connection between source and injury
requires the establishment of several separate steps: (a) Physical and
chemical characterization of the toxic source; (b) determination of the
release rate of the toxic; (c) toxic exposure levels; (d) observation or
calculation of the exposure experienced by the plaintiff; and in case of
human or animal injuries (e) the determination of the dose received, (f)
the target organs of the toxic, and (g) matching of the symptoms
experienced by the victim with those known to be characteristic for the
toxic. Additionally, and in the case of administrative rulemaking there
may be (h) a need for risk assessment and (i) a risk/benefit determina-
tion.
B. The Proof of Causation Involves Several Steps
Each step involves a different group of sciences and each of the
sciences has its own tools and methodology; therefore, each requires its
own education, training and experience. The determination of causation
is an interdisciplinary and re-iterative process.
Source Characterization. The chemical characterization of the
toxic source requires a physical scientist with theoretical and practical
training in inorganic, organic, physical and analytical chemistry.
Dependent upon the nature of the source, it also might require a material
scientist, biologist, geologist or ecologist, and experts from applied
chemical and other sciences.
Source Strength. The determination of the source strength and
" Huber, supra note 8; see KEN R. FOSTER ET AL., PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE
AND THE LAW 18 (1993).
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exposure levels usually includes experimental monitoring, sampling and
qualitative and quantitative measurement based on analytical chemistry
techniques. The expert must be able to select the most suitable
analytical protocols available and must be familiar with standard
sampling and measurement procedures for the toxic at issue.
Exposure Levels. The exposure determination is an interdisciplinary
field that requires familiarity with exposure profiles and the total
integrated exposure methodologies developed by EPA and its contrac-
tors, as well as familiarity with human activities profiles, a field of
social sciences. Typical exposure paths are air inhalation, dermal
contact and ingestion. The actual exposure level is the concentration at
which the victim come into contact with the medium, and the total
exposure is determined by the exposure level and the human activity
profile of the victim." Depending on whether exposure is via inhalation,
dermal contact or ingestion, the determination of the dose received
involves physical chemistry, physiology and pathology.
Dose Calculations. The Dose experienced by a person depends on
the exposure and the dose retention, which are dependent on the target
organ and the victims metabolism.45
Dose-Response Determination. It is widely believed that all
physicians are expert toxicologists. This may have been true during the
middle ages, when poisons were widely used to treat disease. However,
the present standard American medical school curriculum includes only
one short course in toxicology, typically consisting of less than one-
hundred hours of study,46 and the national board exam, consisting of
thousands of questions, normally contains only one question touching
toxicology.47
The determination of toxic effects involves both molecular
toxicology, a specialty that is often practiced by veterinary doctors
holding a Ph.D. in biochemistry, as well as by clinical toxicologist. The
dose-response evaluation is complicated by the fact that toxic effects are
" These concepts go back to pioneering work performed by EPA staff. See, e.g., GUIDELINES
FOR ESTIMATING EXPOSURE, 51 Fed. Reg. 34,042 (1986) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 799); Wayne
Ott, Exposure Estimates Based on Computer Generated Activity Patterns, 21 J. TOXICOLOGY 97,
97-101 (1984).
41 See generally THE EFFECT OF MANMADE ENVIRONMENT ON HEALTH AND BEHAVIOR (L.
Hinkle & W. Berndt eds., 1987).
46 See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA-DAVIS, COURSE PLAN FOR THE MEDICAL
UNDERGRADUATE PROGRAM (1995).
" Interview with Dr. Sylvia Holoyda, Private Medical Practitioner, San Diego, California
(Feb. 20, 1995).
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not linear, that multiple agents are not linearly additive, and that the
experimental determination of long-term exposure to low toxic levels
is time consuming, expensive and that most toxic effects are non-
specific, i.e., the clinical manifestations of toxic symptoms such as
headaches, and gradual memory loss may be the same as those caused
by other disease, or the effects of aging.
The fact that specialties using different tools and methodologies
concern themselves with the same subject matter leads to endless
controversies that puzzle the un-inaugurated, and that are regularly used
by opposing parties to confuse each other and the jury. Examples of
such areas are allergy and immunology, Freudian and Jungian psychia-
try, and, as indicated, molecular and clinical toxicology.
Risk Assessment. Risk assessment involves two distinct steps.
First, a technical determination of the risk and of the technical risk
reduction options, which is the province of scientists, applied mathema-
ticians, engineers and medical specialist; and second, the analysis of
regulatory and political options, which is the province of policy
analysts.
Cost-Benefit Analysis. The cost-benefit analysis deals with the
economics of risk management, and belongs to the province of
economics and policy analysis.
The Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence" details the
following fields: epidemiology, toxicology, survey research, DNA
analysis, statistical inference, multiple regression analysis, and
economic loss estimates.49
C. Each Science and Specialty has its Own Perspectives.
College science students learn and experience that the result of an
investigation depends on the tools and methodology. Two people
looking at the same building from two different angles will not report
the same observations. A physician and a toxicologist look at different
evidence and will conduct different tests.
From the fact that experts use specialized tools and methodologies,
and view problems from specialized vantage points and perspectives, it
follows that their perceptions contain different observations and
4' REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 9, at 524.
4 Kenneth Kneeling, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 121, 125
(1996); Lee Loevinger, Science as Evidence, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 153, 165 (1995).
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opinions.
Because perspectives and assumptions" are an intrinsic part of an
expert's observation and evaluation, they also define an intrinsic limit
to his opinions. Specialists tend to become oblivious to their limits, and
outsiders will not recognize such limits unless they are familiar with the
tools and practices of a profession. Ignorance of professional perspec-
tives, assumptions and limits is the most common source of misunder-
standings, biased opinions, and scientifically incorrect decisions.
III. PROFESSIONAL PERSPECTIVES ARE BIASED
A. Bias in the Medical Profession.
The health care field suffers from a plethora of intra-professional
communication problems." A classical example how professional
specialization, by itself, leads to professional bias is offered by the
various treatment modalities of cancer of the prostate and uterus. This
type of cancer can be treated by surgery, chemotherapy or radiation. The
oldest and best known method, the "gold standard" is still surgery.52
Since each of the treatment modalities requires specialist training, few
doctors are equally familiar with all three modalities. Since one is more
qualified to evaluate the merit of a method with which one is familiar,
specialists will recommend their own methodology. Furthermore, since
each specialist has invested a considerable amount of time and money
building his practice, attending specialist courses, and obtaining local
recognition and admission in his specialty in local hospitals, his advice
is necessarily colored by personal bias.
The degree to which this mix of personal and professional bias
impedes a patient's ability to rely on his own physician has been
described by Andrew Grove,53 and is reflected in the fact that in
California physicians are required to provide breast cancer and prostate
cancer patients with a brochure containing a comparison of surgical,
'o Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 77
JUDICATURE 77(6) (Sept.-Oct. 1993).
5' PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 9-29 (Basic Books
1982) (noting that historic cycles of popularity, licensing; power derive from outside support of
profession, progress in science, internal management of profession and high social status (income)).
2 Andy Grove with Bethany McLean, Taking on Prostate Cancer, FORTUNE, May 13, 1997,
at 56-81.
11 ld. at 6 1.
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radiological and chemotherapy treatments.
4
Similar communication barriers exist between clinical toxicology,
which deals with the clinical manifestation of poisons, and molecular
toxicology, which deals with the biochemical effect of poisons.
Professionals in these two fields will frequently report conflicting
opinions concerning the certainty of causation. This is not necessarily
due to inconsistent observations, or professional errors, incompetence
or rivalry, but due to the fact that the clinical toxicologist depends on
correlation of poisons with non-specific symptoms such as headaches,
light headiness or flu-like symptoms, while molecular toxicologists can
rely on analytical methods and animal experimentation that may offer
a high degree of accuracy and certainty.
A different type of bias is observed between health science
researchers and clinical practitioners. Here, the problem is related to the
fact that health scientists depend on institutional facilities and are
employees of medium-sized to large institutions, while most clinical
practitioners are still operating as small and independent business
people whose livelihoods depend on fee for services or capitation
payments.5
Health scientists and clinical practitioners also differ in the
methodologies used for decision making: While health scientists strive
to isolate parameters in order to find generally valid answers that can be
replicated, clinicians usually face time constraints and complex
problems characterized by a large number of unknown parameters. The
problems with information transfer between health scientists and
clinicians who rely on local consensus have been expensively studied
and explained by Greer. 6
A more thorny problem concerns the communication gap between
physicians, osteopaths, chiropractors, and other health care practitioners.
The relationship between the different arts of healing is characterized by
a deep schism between organized medicine and the practitioners of most
- CALIFORNIA HEALTH SERVICES, HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE, § 1704.5 (1990) (breast
cancer), and § 1704.7 (1990) (prostate cancer). The brochure is updated every five years by the
State Cancer Advisory Council, consisting of 9 physicians, 3 non-physicians, 2 non-profit cancer
research institutes recognized by the National Cancer Institute, and the Director of the California
Department of Health Services.
" MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY ANDMORALS 1-18, 55-98, 152-165 (1993).
16 Ann L. Greer, The State of the Art Versus the State of the Science, 4 INT. J. TECH.
ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 5, 5-25 (1988); see also A. L. Greer, Scientific Knowledge and
Social Consensus, in CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS 15: 431-36 (1994) (clinicians seek solution
to problem of uncertainty from local opinion leaders.).
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other healing arts. 7 Until recently, organized medicine either ignored
the existence of other healers, or denied their legitimacy and lumped all
of them together with quackery. As a result, some of the healing arts
are excluded from hospital,59 insurance and government credentials, and
not all states recognize the same professions.' The battle between the
American Medical Association and the chiropractic profession was
described by the court as a war "to contain and eliminate" the
chiropractic profession.6
This schism is due to several factors. First, the fierce economic
competition in the health care field; and, second, the fact that the
different healing arts subscribe to partly conflicting philosophies.
61
While the traditional allopathic doctors concern themselves with healing
diseases, the osteopathic doctors subscribe to a holistic view of
maintaining over-all health.63 Third, their arts operate at different levels
of sophistication. 64 Fourth, and most of all, because the different
schools are so far apart in their philosophies that they lack even
rudimentary understanding of each other. The fifth reason, which flows
from the fourth, is that competing health care practitioners find it hard
to distinguish arts with which they are not familiar from quackery which
always lurks in the shadow of any health care practice.
" STARR supra note 51, at 127-44.
" See Ellen Hogdson, Restrictions on Unorthodox Health Treatment in California: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 24 UCLA L. REv. 647, 647-696 (1977). Note, Quackery in California,
II STAN. L. REV. 265 (1959); Dana Ullman, The Mainstreaming of Alternative Medicine, 36
HEALTH FORUM J. 24, 24-30 (Nov. 1993).
'9 Rebecca Berg, HMO Exclusion of Chiropractors, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 807,807-38 (1993).
'o Nevada recognizes and licenses the following as health care providers: physicians and
their assistants, practitioners of homeopathic medicine, osteopathic medicine, dentistry, licensed
nurses, dispensing optician, optometrist, registered physical therapist, podiatric physician, licensed
psychologists, licensed marriage and family therapists, chiropractor, doctors of oriental medicine
in any form, medical laboratory directors or technicians, pharmacists or licensed hospitals as the
employers of such persons. NEV. REV. STAT. § 629.031 (1995); California has a similar listing:
Bus. PROF. CODE §§ 500 et seq. (1990).
" Wilk v. American Med. Ass'n, 895 F.2d 352, 370 (7th Cir.).
'2 Physicians and surgeons practice allopathic medicine, i.e. healing of diseases, while
osteopaths and some other healers promote the prevention of diseases.
"' STARR, supra note 51, at 45-99, 223. The National Institute of Medicine established in
1992 an Office for Alternative Medicine.
' While the medical literature consists of literally hundreds of thousands of research articles,
and dentistry is also strongly built on scientific and clinical literature, some of the other fields, such
as chiropractic, consist of fewer than seventy-five control studies. This total is less than the weekly
number of articles in the peer reviewed medical literature. See Paul G. Shekelle et al., The
Appropriateness of Spinal Manipulation for Low-Back Pain: Project Overview and Literature
Review 1-7 (1991).
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While the organized medical profession continues to resist
cooperation,65 many of their leaders recognize the importance of overall
physical and mental well-being' and the harm that this division causes
health care delivery, and have tried to bridge the gap. Furthermore,
the National Institute of Medicine established in 1992 an Office for
Alternative Medicine.
Similarly intense turf battles have been fought between dentists and
dental hygienists68 as well as doctors and nurse practitioners over the
scope of responsibilities of the parties. These battles have resulted in
disagreement over the standard of care and have contributed to regional
disputes over treatment modalities, resulting in a persistent inability of
the medical profession to regulate itself.9 Medicine started as an art
that was taught and transmitted through a personal apprentice system,
and the Hippocratic Oath which was refined by Samuel Bard and
Thomas Percival7" puts loyalty to mentors and colleagues on an equal
level with loyalty to patients. This accounts for the "conspiracy of
silence, '71 which hampers the ability of doctors and many other
professionals to testify candidly about the incompetence of colleagues,
both in court and in licensing procedures. This collegial loyalty also
casts a shadow over the actions of medical screening panels and many
decisions of the organized medical profession.
Finally, the medical profession, like the sciences and all other
professions is subject to financial conflicts of interest. One manifesta-
* See Wilk, 895 F.2d at 370.
See, e.g., Kenneth A. Frank & Donald S. Krefeld, Stress and Stress Management in THE
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS; COMPLETE HOME GUIDE TO
MENTAL HEALTH Ch. 24 (Lois B. Morris, ed., 1992).
61 See, e.g., ANDREW WELL, NATURAL HEALTH; NATURAL MEDICINE 1-10 (1990); see also
ANDREW WEIL, HEALTH AND HEALING; UNDERSTANDING CONVENTIONAL AND ALTERNATIVE
MEDICINE 5-7 (1996).
61 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Cal. Dental Hygienists' Ass'n, 271 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. App. 1990).
69 R. C. Fellmeth, Physician Discipline in California: A Code Blue Emergency, 9 (No. 2)
CAL. REG. L. RPTR. 1, (1989); B. Friedland & R. W. Valachovic, The Regulation of Dental
Licensing: The DarkAges? 17 Am. J.L. & MED. 249, 265 (1991) (arguing that it makes sense to
have regionally narrow, local licensing for harbor pilots, because each harbor has a different
topology, but that changing dental standards along state lines is excessively restrictive, because the
human anatomy does not change along political borders.).
"' THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH (HIPPOCRATIC CORPUS) (W.H.S. Jones, trans. 1923); William F.
May, Code and Covenant or Philanthropy and Contract?, in ETHICS IN MEDICINE 65-76 (S. J.
Reiser ed. 1974).
" Agnew v. Parks, 343 P.2d 118, 123 (Cal. App. 1959).
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tion of this is the "remunerative standard of care, 7 2 which also plagues
the dental profession.73
B. Bias in the Physical and Social Sciences
In academe the pride of opinion and professional rivalry74 are
continuing causes for intense conflict. An example is the professional
and personal friction between Edward Teller and Robert Oppenheimer,
which has been the subject of a play.75 The public rivalry between
Robert Gallo of the National Institute of Health (NIH) and Luc
Montagnier and his colleagues at the Institut Pasteur in Paris concerned
claims of priority for the discovery and patent rights of the HIV virus.
The latter dispute was eventually resolved by intervention of the
Presidents of France and the United States.76 These types of rivalry are
fairly common.77 Work leading to many a Nobel prize has been marred
by similar disputes.
Such rivalries are fueled by the fact that the experimental sciences
depend on expensive equipment, and thus compete for funds and
political sponsorship. The nature of this type of competition is reflected
in claims of credit for discoveries and inventions, peer review proceed-
ings to establish priorities among projects and allocation of funds, and
castigation of peers because of philosophical disagreement and
educational, national and even racial bias. Such rivalry is also reflected
in favoritism and nepotism between grant applicants and between
sponsors and grantees. In addition, conflicts of interest, which can take
7 In his classic study, Lembcke found in 1958 that 70% of all operations on the uterus,
ovaries and fallopian tubes resulting in sterilization in one U.S. hospital were unjustified. Paul
Lembcke, Medical Auditing by Scientific Methods: Illustrated by Major Female Pelvic Surgery,
162 JAMA 646, 652-53 (1956). In 1988, researchers found that of 382 permanent pacemaker
implantations, 77 were unwarranted and 84% of these should have been identified as such solely
on the basis of the diagnosis or detected abnormality, without any need for a diagnostic work up.
Kay Greenspan et al., Incidence of Unwarranted Implantation ofPermanent Cardiac Pacemakers
in a Large Medical Population, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 158, 161 (1988). See also RoDw N, supra
note 55, at 256-58.
7" Jay W. Friedman & Kathryn A. Atchison, The Standard of Care: An Ethical Responsibility
of Public Health Dentistry, 53 J. PUB. HEALTH DENT. 165, 165-69 (1993).
'4 Foster, supra note 4, at 184-5 (citing James Fitzjames Stephens).
7 JOHN ALSOP & STEPHEN ALSOP, WE ACCUSE: THE STORY OF THE MISCARRIAGE OF
AMERICAN JUSTICE ON THE CASE OF J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER 50-56 (1954); STANLEY A.
BLUMBERG, ENERGY AND CONFLICT: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF EDWARD TELLER 93-99 (1976).
76 Jon Cohen, U.S.-French Patent Dispute Heads for a Showdown, 265 SCIENCE 23,23-25
(1994).
" Sharon Begley & Adams Rogers, War ofthe Worlds, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10, 1997, at 53-8.
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two forms, have a similar effect: Financial conflicts of interest, where
a decision maker stands to gain financially or suffers a loss as a result
of a granting decision affecting another party; and, research conflicts of
interest, where the probability of success of one project reduces that of
another project. Tunnel vision, consisting of a professional not being
able to see a problem from the perspective of colleagues using a
different tool or methodology, and political pressure and lobbying to
shift decision making from the objectively most desirable solution to
one that profits insiders or influence-peddlers also profoundly affect this
area.
78
The influence of economic self-interest is inherent in all profes-
sional fields where professionals are self-employed and live from fees
paid for service.
C. The Advocacy of Professional Organizations.
On the one hand, professional organization serve their members as
a forum for technical exchange and continued education; on the other
hand, they serve as political champions for protecting the interests of the
profession against competitors, the government and the public. The
organized professions also compete with academe and licensing boards
in setting and implementing the professional standards of care and
ethics.
The American Dental Association maintains an active, judicial role
in patient-dentist conflicts, and in professional discipline.79 Further-
more, after three decades of jostling and a four-week federal administra-
tive trial, a federal administrative law judge found that the California
Dental Association, a member of the ADA, engaged in a continuing
conspiracy to fix the price of dental services."0 The transcript of the trial
testimony of association officers and the decision provide an intimate
glimpse at the contemporary mentality and problems of trade organiza-
tions, and show that some trade associations do not fear government.
The history of the century old battle over the safety of dental
7' Thomas 0. MeGarity, Peer Review in Awarding Federal Grants in the Arts and Sciences,
9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1-91, 42 (Spring 1994).
'9 Joanne Boyd, Legal Action Alternative, 6 CDA UPDATE 10, 13 (1994) (Lori Bennet, peer
review coordinator for Sacramento District Dental Society reports, "I've seen the system work and
I've found it to be fair." Bennet receives 10 calls per week; half are decided in favor of the
patient.).
" Final Order, California Dental Ass'n, No 9259 (FTC, March 26, 1996).
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amalgam"' further illuminates the irrational decisions that result when
an organization has conflicting goals.8
Variations of this type of conflict are common among professional
associations. Thus, the American Chemical Society (ACS) is not only
the publisher of more than a dozen of the world's most prestigious
technical journals, it organizes biannual technical meetings that serve as
an international forum for catalyzing progress in all fields of academic
and applied chemistry. Less visible to its academic members, however,
is the fact that the ACS also takes an active role in protecting and
defending the chemical industry against public criticism and litigation.
8 3
D. The Advocacy of State Licensing Boards
The poor ability of professional organizations and licensing boards
to rationally resolve their internal problems is notorious. Licensing
boards tend to close their eyes professional misconduct as long as
possible: Their handling of complaints and conduct of investigation is
often political, and once a complaint is accepted the case is usually
turned over to the state Attorney General and the fate of the licensee is
sealed."
Medical and dental licensing is regulated by the states, and the state
licensing boards jealously observe their right to maintain and enforce
regional differences in the standard of care, even though medical and
dental education has long been standardized on a national level.8
The American Dental Association (ADA) has an elaborate
mandatory private internal peer review system that handles disputes
regarding the quality of dental treatment, the appropriateness of dental
treatment, and the utilization of irregular billing practices. According
to the California Dental Association (CDA), almost fifty percent of the
fee disputes by patients and insurers and patient complaints about
" ROBERT W. MCCLUGOAGE, A HISTORY OF THE ADA, A CENTURY OF HEALTH SERVICE 67-
89(1959).
2 Michael A. Royal, Amalgam Fillings: Do Dental Patients Have a Right to Informed
Consent? - Risks Suggested by (admittedly controversial) Studies ofAmalgam Fillings Warrant
Permitting Patients to Choose Alternatives, 2 RISK: ISSUES IN HEALTH & SAFETY 141 (1996).
" ACS submitted an Amicus Curiae Brief severely criticizing a federal judge, and arguing
that expert witnesses for the chemical industry should not need to disclose all of the laboratory
experiments they conducted. Bush Ranch v. E.I. DuPont, Case No. 95-9059 (11 th Cir. 1995). See
also A CS Files "Friend of the Court " Benlate Brief CHEM.& ENG. NEwS, Dec. 18, 1995, at 7.
R4 Fellmeth, supra note 69, at 3-5.
's INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, DENTAL EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS (1995).
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quality are decided against the dentist. The peer review procedure is
well settled; it is adjusted to comply with differences in state laws, and
ADA members comply with it even though it is a star chamber
proceeding in that the accused dentist is not allowed to confront the
accuser or observe the independent dental exam, and does not have
access to the expert reports."6
IV. INTERDISCIPLINARY COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS.
All of the above problems also affect interdisciplinary communica-
tions. However, the barrier is further aggravated by differences in
education, tools, methodology, and the social structures of the profes-
sions. The following is only one example.
A. Risk Assessment
The determination of risk involves scientific and policy issues. The
interdisciplinary nature of the problem triggers the Peter principle:87
Scientists are tempted to make social decisions; social scientists and
lawyers are tempted to make scientific decisions, and both tend to make
decisions that trespass upon the rights of affected third parties. This can
result in scientifically or socially untenable proposals, such as the
concept of "zero-risk."
This problem is analogous to the relation between experts and the
court, or medical doctors and their patients. The solution is to separate
responsibility for technical questions along professional lines and leave
the decision making to the representatives of those who are affected by
the decision.8
Kantrowitz, who championed the "Science Court" approach,89 has
shown that technical arguments and disagreements can be effectively
6 See. e.g., CALIFORNIA DENTAL ASSOCIATION, CDA PEER REVIEW MANUAL 4C 1-4C5 (1989
revised in 1992); see also CALIFORNIA DENTAL ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE ASSESSMENT
OF CLINICAL QUALITY AND PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE 6-10 (3rd ed. 1992).
11 LAURENCE J. PETER & RAYMOND HULL, THE PETER PRINCIPLE: WHY THINGS Go WRONG
6 (1969) (In a hierarchy every employee tends to rise to his level of incompetence).
" Determining the cause of a disease and identifying treatment options is the province of the
medical specialist, but the selection of the choice is not a medical question, but a question that
affects the autonomy of the patient, and therefore should be decided by the patient. Cobbs v. Grant,
502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972).
9 Carl F. Cranor, Science Courts Evidentiary Procedures and Mixed Science-Policy
Decisions, 4 RISK: ISSUES IN HEALTH & SAFETY 113, 113 (Spring 1993); Jon R. Cavicchi, The
Science Court: A Bibliography, 4 RISK: ISSUES IN HEALTH & SAFETY, 171, 171 (Spring 1993).
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resolved in an open forum of professional peers, where assumptions,
contingencies and errors of logic can be easily established.90
The problem with the science court is that scientists, and especially
engineers, are accustomed to working within a hierarchic structure, and
are not trained to balance technical and social concerns. This is shown
in the manner in which scientists coped with allegations of research
fraud in the case of Berge,91 and in the case of professor Ninnemann
whose colleagues and peers, as well as the peer review committees at
the University of Utah and the University of California San Diego
ignored complaints and looked on while Ninnemann continued to
produce and publish fabricated research data.92
B. Not All Experts are Equally Skilled and Knowledgeable
The skill level required of an expert depends on the task. If one
needs to know the approximate speed of a vehicle, or the approximate
alcohol level in blood, one commonly relies on the testimony of a
policeman trained in the use of standard instruments calibrated by
standard methods. If however, the speed is a critical issue, or if the
accuracy of the instrument is contested, one might need the testimony
of physics professors who are familiar with the theory of radar and can
determine whether the commercial instrument used to measure speed is
capable of the requisite accuracy, and whether it is properly calibrated
to do its job.
The criminal trial of 0. J. Simpson has demonstrated that the
relevancy of such issues is not only decided by the judge, but depends
on the skill of counsel, and the resources of the parties. The same is true
in environmental and product liability cases.
While in large class action cases, the parties usually find access to
competent experts, the parties in medium-sized and smaller cases
usually face formidable economical and practical difficulties. The result
is that experts testify beyond their specialty or competence. This
situation is common in criminal cases involving illicit drugs, where for
economic reasons forensic experts are often allowed to speculate about
the toxic effects of substances about which many have no special
9 Kantrowitz, supra note 6, at 1.
"' United States er rel. Berge v. Board of Trustees of University of Alabama, 104 F.3d 1453
(4th Cir. 1997).
'2 United States ex rel. Condie v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 89-3550 (D.C. N. Cal.
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knowledge, because they are laboratory technicians without toxicologi-
cal training. The same situation occurs in toxic injury litigation in state
courts.
C. Trade Secrets
A separate problem in environmental and product liability cases is
that the chemical composition and properties of the suspected toxic
source almost always involve trade secrets. Trade secrets can hamper
not only plaintiffs, but both parties, because in the highly competitive
chemical and pharmaceutical industries, the trade secret may be more
valuable than the outcome of an individual litigation.
V. Cultural Differences between Law and the Sciences
Lawyers, scientists, engineers and politicians share the goal of
solving problems with a standardized approach,93 but their education,
training, methodologies and professional cultures and goals are
distinctly different.
Scientists are pioneers; they constantly strive to expand the universe
within which they work by generating and testing empirically verifiable
propositions; their goal is discovery of new data and they translate their
findings into universally valid scientific formulas and laws. Scientists
seek unambiguous facts. 4 Their world focuses on right or wrong,
because nature usually does not offer pluralistic choices. The percep-
tion, attributed to Kuhn," that a scientific fact is a collective judgment
of a specialized community, does not apply to the physical sciences
because the physical scientists derive results and laws by isolating
individual parameters so that their results can be replicated at any time
and any place by anyone who has the requisite skill and physical
facilities. Scientists expect full reproducibility, i.e., one hundred
percent of the data must lie within the limits of accuracy intrinsic in an
experiment. In contrast, social research usually deals with complex sets
of parameters that cannot be easily untangled.
Scientists in biotechnology and the health sciences pursue the same
goals, but due to the relative novelty of their fields they have a much
" Schuck, supra note 2, at 2.
' NOREEN L. CHANNELS, SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODS IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 16-27 (1985).
0' HUBER, supra note 8, at 226.
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smaller information base and must live with a relatively modest
threshold of proof.
Engineers apply laws generated by scientists for the solution of
practical problems. Engineers are bridge builders and airline pilots.
Depending on the application, engineers expect one hundred percent
certainty of the outcome. Engineers and health care providers are
members of licensed professions. This means that they must draw on
a closed universe of methodologies, tools and knowledge, and they are
subject to discipline and loss of their license.
The methodology of physicians and surgeons is the product of
medieval traditions and constitutes a highly formalized art that draws on
the experience of mentors' to organize and interpret the usually limited
information about their patients and her diseases. Physicians tradition-
ally deal with clinical manifestations, and classify diseases and disorders
according to their symptoms, without time for waiting for proof of
causation.97 Surgeons and physicians and other clinical professions are
accustomed to dealing with uncertainty when reaching collegial
consensus on the rapidly achievable treatment modality.9" The
physician's standards are based on professional custom." The problem
with implementing practice protocols and nationwide standards has been
extensively reviewed."°
Clinicians do not require that the choice of diagnosis and treatment
methodology meet the legal standard of proof; clinicians are satisfied if
it is probable that they have chosen the correct path. The strength of the
clinical methodology is the ability to produce localized consensus that
is in compliance with the applicable standard of care.
Lawyers seek universally abstract, binding propositions about what
state of the social world should be sought. However, the lawyer's
STARR, supra note 51, at 3-29; May, supra note 70, 65-76.
, Disease is defined as;
a pervasive, clinically significant psychological or biological syndrome
or patterns of symptoms. A disease may result in present distress or
disability, or may remain dormant until such time that factors within the
individual or the surrounding environment cause the symptoms of the
disease to manifest themselves. A disease, although having a physiolog-
ical origin, may manifest itself in a behavioral, psychological and/or
biological manner.
DICTIONARY OF MEDICAL DEFINITIONS (1995).
G' Oreer, supra note 56, at 5-25.
9 Eleanor D. Kinney & Marilyn M. Wilder. Medical Standard Setting, 22 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 421, 441 (1989).
'00 Greer, supra note 56, at 5-25; STARR, supra, note 51, at 203.
[VOL. 12:35
1996-97] EXPERT WITNESSES: A VIEW FROM THE TRENCHES 57
version of truth is not that of science. Lawyers, like doctors, are
accustomed to making decisions without knowing all the facts; they are
accustomed to balancing pluralistic goals, rather than to choosing
between right and wrong. Oliver Wendell Holmes stated, "I define truth
as the system of my limitations, and leave absolute truth to those who
are better equipped."' 0 '
However, the degree with which a practicing lawyer strives to seek
facts, simplicity and certainty depends on his client's case and the issues
at hand. Law is autonomous in finding facts. It is noteworthy that a
large fraction of the legal profession resents any form of compelled
disclosure of records and information to such an extent that the adoption
of the revised rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 had to be
left to the discretion of individual federal districts, even though prior
experience with similar rules in state courts had demonstrated signifi-
cant reduction in litigation costs.'0 2
The strength of the legal proceeding is its ability to produce
localized, content-specific epistemological and normative understand-
ings that are not subordinate to inappropriately universal claims and
standards." 3 Its weakness is that its deliberations are slow, and it has
not been able to embrace the accelerating growth of science and
technology."°
In summary, the physical sciences, social sciences, engineering,
health care sciences, clinical medicine and law represent different
cultures, and each has its own relation to the world, including the world
of politics.0 5
A. Neither Scientists nor Lawyers are Trained to Bridge Cultural
Differences
Due to the explosion of knowledge and the increasing specialization
in education and within the professions, it has become impossible to
teach all skills and knowledge in the traditional four-year college
curriculum. Instead, the gaps between professions have been filled with
... Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, 10 LEE L.R. 1, 2 (1915).
02 The analogue rule, NEV. REv. STAT. § 16.1 (1996), has been used in Nevada since 1988.
03 SCIENCE AT BAR, supra note 7, at 222.
104 M. H. Hoeflich & Karen Norheden Hoeflich, Accelerating Science: A Problem for the
Legal System. 60 UMKC L. REV. 717-727, 721 (Summer 1992).
0 Politics differs from law and science in that it inevitably compromises principles, because
its primary goal is to accommodate, and allow participation by all. Furthermore, politics needs to
strive for accountability to justify the state's coercive authority. Schuck, supra note 2, at 35.
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new interdisciplinary professions and training programs, which, by
themselves, have become specialized.
This specialization has triggered power struggles, turf wars and
other political jostling that stress self-serving goals and formation of
separate professional cultures and subcultures at the expense of overall
societal perspectives.
There have been many proposals to facilitate interdisciplinary
communication in the legal context. The oldest forum for solving
technical questions is the National Research Counsel of the National
Academy of Sciences." 6 Federal regulatory agencies regularly contract
with NAS/NRC to obtain technical regulatory advice.0 7 In the field of
administrative and regulatory decision making, EPA, OSHA, the FDA,
the CPSC and other federal agencies have experimented with differing
success with a variety of agency advisory schemes to help establish
consensus in scientific and technical matters. °8
The problem with these committees is that much of the important
scientific and technical knowledge and know-how is in the hands of
specialists who lack time for, and an interest in, and, perhaps, an
understanding of the importance of interdisciplinary information
transfer. In addition, these specialists resist participation in regulatory
and court-related activities. Unfortunately, the organized professions
have been equally unsuccessful at solving the problem, at least partly
because of the conflict of interest between their political and technical
roles. Obviously, the courts cannot wait for the situation to improve.
B. The Information Transfer in the Court
The information that reaches the trier of fact is limited by the skill
and tools of the observer, the competence and communication skills of
the experts and the application of evidence rules.
The trier of fact encounters further hurdles: First, the content of an
expert witness' observations, findings and opinions cannot be under-
stood and weighed for its relevancy by anyone-judge, attorney, juror
or party-without supplemental knowledge and understanding of the
relevant cultural factors and experimental assumptions.
"o The Act of Congress creating the Committee was signed by President Abraham Lincoln
on March 3, 1863.
'0' 1 WILLIAM ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 70 (1986).
"' Sheila Jasanoff,, Procedural Choices in Regulatory Science. 4 RISK: ISSUES IN HEALTH
SAFETY 143, 143 (1993).
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Because scientists spend most of their time around fellow scientists,
most lack an appreciation for the interdisciplinary communication gap.
Accordingly, such knowledge and understanding must be acquired by
the attorneys during pre-trial procedures and conveyed to the judge and
the jurors in trial. The most important tool for this is cross-examination
and redirect."°
Second, the understanding and evaluation of scientific expert
testimony requires some educational preparation in such fields as
physics, chemistry and mathematics.' An attorney who avoided
college calculus, algebra, and statistical courses, and mathematical story
problems, and who has no experience in setting up simple equations,
cannot expect to understand the significance of assumptions that are
intrinsic in scientific testimony, and should probably avoid litigating
environmental and toxic tort cases."l'
Third, the typical science expert's communication problem is
aggravated by the heavy emphasis on oral testimony that is characteris-
tic of our American litigation system"2 because the transmission of
scientific fact is a reiterative process that requires time for thought, and
room for follow-up questions to verify. This interferes with the play-
acting that is prevailing in the contemporary court room, and serves the
purpose of validating the identity and authority of the various actors. "3
"o A full cross-examination of a witness upon the subject of his examination in chief is the
absolute right, not the mere privilege of a party and a denial of this right is a prejudicial and fatal
error. Gilmer v. Higley, 110 U.S. 47, 50 (1884); see also Lindsey v. United States, 133 F.2d 368,
(D.C. Cir. 1942), overruled on other grounds by 405 F.2d 1352, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
11 The influence of education on perception was demonstrated in the pioneering work of
Piaget. JEAN PIACEr, THE CHILD'S CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD (1929).
. Few attorneys would venture to litigate tax cases, unless they have specialized training in
law and in accounting. The difference in attitude towards science is striking if one considers that
it is frowned upon, and in some jurisdictions an ethical violation for an attorney to identify his
technical degrees and qualifications.
2' In the U.S., oral proceedings in open court have been taken for granted since the beginning
of its history. The necessity of an oral hearing follows from fundamentals of English procedure
including trial by jury and the right to cross-examine all witnesses whose testimony forms the basis
of decision. The psychological foundation and operational effectiveness of cross-examination as
a truth-seeking tool depends on the spontaneity of an oral response to a question in front of the
triers of fact. The exclusionary rules barring hearsay evidence safeguard the right to cross-examine
by requiring direct and immediate contact of the court with the sources of information.
Hammelmann, Expert Evidence, 10 MOD. L. REV. 32, 32 (1947); see also Adolf Homburger,
Functions of Orality in Austrian and American Civil Procedure, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 9-39, 33
(1970).
113 For an excellent literature review, see, e.g., DAVID E. ASTHMA, Courtroom Majesty and
Defendant Frames: A Theater of Powerlessness (1995) (masters thesis, on file with author).
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C. Comparison of the Common Law Court With Other Systems
1. Foreign Countries
The problem with expert testimony is unique to the American
system of jury trials at common law. In the civil law countries of
Europe, the judge conducts discovery and appoints experts who provide
their advice prior to trial in the form of written reports." 4 This leaves
time for the parties to submit expert opinions to review by professional
peers, whether the peers are participating in the litigation or not. As
Kantrowitz points out, the opportunity of peer review of expert opinion
greatly increases the technical candor of experts, and eliminates most
frivolous disputes."5
Our system further differs in the heavy emphasis on procedural
questions and evidentiary rules. France, for example, does not work
with an elaborate evidence code, partly because the procedure involves
more written communications, and partly because French law does not
seek to finding legal facts, but is satisfied with determining presump-
tions.' '
6
Finally, the U.S. procedures now differ from those in England and
Canada where the use of court-appointed expert witnesses has been
formalized since 1960.
2. Administrative Procedures
The procedures for transferring scientific information in federal
administrative agencies is still in flux, and different among agencies.
In addition to the solicitation of public comments provided for under the
Administrative Procedure Act, most agencies use some form of advisory
counsel or advisory committee." 7
', ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG §§402-13 (1877, rev. 1950), translated in CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURES OF GERMANY (Engl. trans. by S. L. Gosen trans., 1990).
" Kantrowitz, supra note 6, at 1.
" R. DAVID & M. KINDRED, FRENCH LAW: STRUCTURE, SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY 72-3
(1972); H. P. DEVRIES, CIVIL LAW AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAWYER 199-206 (1976).
"' Sheila Jasanoff, Peer Review in the Regulatory Process, 10 (No. 52) SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY, AND HUMAN VALUES 20, 20 (1985).
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3. Medical Screening Panels and Peer Review Boards
Efforts to resolve communication problems at the interface between
law and medicine trace back over a long period of time. The medical
profession has always wanted to remove medical decisions from the
legal forum and place in the hands of medical panels and boards; or,
alternatively, to establish medical screening panels as gatekeepers.
Such panels have been in effect in New York since 1958,11 and have
since been introduced in many other states. The theory is that medical
negligence should not be handled by lay jurors awarding damages to
patients, but by medical peers disciplining their colleagues. But medical
licensing boards are living proof that the goal of fair and effective self-
discipline has not yet been reached in the medical profession." 9
The organized dental profession has taken a different approach and
uses its local component society for peer review. The use of the system
is voluntary for patients but mandatory for ADA members. The system
has been in effect for more than a decade and reportedly works well. 2°
However, this system tramples the constitutional rights of the dentists
because the system does not allow confrontation with the plaintiff, and
the defendant is not fully informed about the charges.
A full discussion of the recent gradual reform of the Federal Rules
of Evidence is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it should be
mentioned that the recent change of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
26, which affects pre-trial discovery of expert testimony, has been
implemented on a voluntary basis, leaving each jurisdiction to decide to
what extent it wants to implement early exchange of documents and
witness lists.
VI. REFORMS
A. Effect of Economic, Political, and Technological Cycles
Environmental, toxic tort and products liability law are strongly tied
to economic and political considerations, and are based on the concept
that the cost of injury should be borne by the party who is best posi-
tioned to avoid the damage, i.e., the manufacturer. The foundation for
" IMPARTIAL MEDICAL TESTIMONY, supra note 24, at 83-86.
'9 Fellmeth, supra note 69.
120 Bennet, supra note 79, at 13.
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the current products liability law was formulated during the 1960s, 12 1
and environmental law during the 1970s, 1'2 i.e., during a period of
relative wealth that followed World War II.
Since then the U.S. economy has changed cycles. Even though the
interpretation of economic indicators is susceptible to different
interpretations, it is generally agreed that the gross national product of
our country has slipped relative to that of several other industrial
nations, and that the net income from wages, expressed as percentage of
gross national income, has steadily decreased relative to corporate
income since 1979. It is also clear that government and corporations
have significantly downsized their employment.'23 And the power of
consumers, which was always smaller than that of the organized
professions,'24 has further decreased.
Because the quality of our life is determined by a balance between
earning a decent income and environmental safety, it is obvious that a
reduction in income coupled with a reduction in job security have
reduced our own sense of well-being and our generosity towards the
victims of toxic or product injury.
Furthermore, minimum sentencing laws, drug legislation and
statutory legal initiatives indicate an increased legislative activism that
is somewhat reminiscent of the period of the French revolution when the
legislature took over the courts' functions.'25 While wage earners are
preoccupied with holding onto jobs, the efforts of industries and
corporations to reduce their obligations to the public and consumers has
resulted in legislative initiatives for tort reform.
Finally, the golden age of the basic sciences has left us with a vast
amount of discovery that needs to be integrated into the body of
established science. This affords new opportunities to test established
paradigms, a process that can disturb the power balance among
scientific authorities, and which can be confusing the outside
observers. 1
2 6
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
122 I WILLIAM ROGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER 70 (1986).
2, Eric Blom, Rich & Poor, PORTLAND HERALD, May 4, 1996, at 22. Available at
<http://www.portand.comrichpoorlday7.htm> (March 22,1997); WILLIAME. HUDSON, AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY IN PERIL, SEVEN CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S FUTURE (Rev. ed. 1995).
24 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 137-60 (1962).
23 DAVID & KINDRED, supra note 116, at 73.
216 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43-51 (2nd ed. 1972).
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B. Special Interest Groups
A great amount of pressure for reform has come from the industries
that bear a large share of the cost for environmental and products
liability actions, i.e., the insurance, chemical and hospital industries, and
the organized health care professions. Their views have been advanced
through think tanks, 2 ' through media campaigns, and direct lobbying
of decisonakers. The problem is that the political debate and media
reports are not always accurate, 2 ' and much of the anecdotal claims are
not supported by statistical analysis. Furthermore, the public is
vulnerable to negativism and rumors. 2 9
The group with the longest experience in seeking favorable
treatment is the medical profession. 3' Several well respected medical
journals have been actively supporting medical and toxic tort reform.' 3'
Tort reform has also been supported by the National Academy of
Science and the American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS), who publishes Science magazine. AAAS also initiated the
formation of a National Council for Law and Science, which is
comprised of 14 members, half selected by the American Bar Associa-
tion, and half by AAAS. 32 Two of the current members are scientists,
eight are lawyers and six are policy analysts.
Another source of criticism of the expert system has been the
scientific policy community,'33 which argues that its experience in
2 Examples of active think tanks are the Heritage Foundation and the Einstein Institute for
Science, Health and the Courts.
' Many anecdotal reports underlying tort reform are not supported by statistics. Compare,
e.g,. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, TORT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES: CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE
COURTS 1992, (report compiled by Steven K. Smith, Carol J. DeFrances and Patrick A. Langan
(April 3, 1995)).
29 See, e.g., Joel Achenbach, Reality Check: You Can't Believe Everything You Read. But
You 'd Better Believe This; THE WASHINGTON POST, Wednesday, December 4, 1996, at C I (noting
that the information age has one nagging problem: much of the information is not true).
.30 IMPARTIAL MEDICAL EVALUATION, supra, note 23.
131 A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claim and Adverse Events Due
to Negligence., 325 N. ENG. J. MED. 245,251 (1991); Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between
Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1963 (1996); MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND
THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 87-88 (1996).
"' The National Council of Lawyers and Scientists was established in 1984. Half of the
Members are appointed by the AAAS, half by the ABA section on Technology. The reports are
not available to the public or AAAS members (personal observation of the author, March 1996).
3 CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 8; see generally
Jasanoff, supra notes 3, 7, 50.
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handling the interface between science and politics equips it best to act
as gatekeeper for the transfer of science into the courts.
A persuasive source of pressure towards reform have been the
federal trial courts, who have felt burdened by the onslaught of asbestos
and other toxic litigations and who felt that experts took too much of
their time and had an undue influence on juries.3 4 However, the latter
claim has been contested."'
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court responded to this situation in
Daubert,'36 and the Federal Judicial Center followed up in 1994 by
publishing the first edition of the Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence. The history of this development has been well docu-
mented. 3 7
While a there has been widespread agreement that the relation
between science and the courts should change, the different reformers
disagree whether science should play a larger or a smaller role, i.e.,
whether the admissibility of scientific evidence should be increased or
decreased.
Since the prevailing criticism is that juries will tend to believe
expert testimony regardless of its validity and reliability, especially
when faced with a mutilated, deformed child as the plaintiff and a large
corporate drug company as the defendant, it has been argued that the
admissibility of scientific evidence has little to do with science, but is
a public policy decision.'
i "Expert evidence can both be powerful and misleading because of the difficulty in
evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative force
under Rule 403 exercises more control over experts than lay witnesses." J. Weinstein, 138 F.D.R.,
632.
135 Standards for Admitting Scientific Evidence. A Critique From the Perspective of Juror
Psychology. 28 VILL. L. Rv. 554, 566-70 (1983).
'3 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
' Lee Loevinger, Science as Evidence, 35 JURIMETRICS J., 153, 153-90 (1995); Joseph R.
Meaney, From Frye to Daubert: Is a Pattern Unfolding? 35 JURIMETRIcS J. 191-201 (1995);
Kenneth Kreiling, Reference Manual on'Scientific Evidence, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 121, (1996).
3' Nancy Miller, Daubert and Junk Science: Have Admissibility Standards Changed?
Revised and edited version of the paper with which the author won first place in the 1994 IADC
Legal Writing Contest sponsored by the ABA, International Association of Defense Counsel,
1994).(visited May 23, 1997) <http://www.wbggh.org/frontlinet>.
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CONCLUSION
When the facts are clear, the science is settled, and the experts are
competent, science and law can cooperate harmoniously in resolving
technical disputes because scientific questions can be unambiguously
answered. This is true, regardless of what type of profession the
specialist represents, because in the sciences and in engineering the end
result is independent of the chosen path.'39
The situation is different when science is unsettled, if there are
interdisciplinary gaps, or if experts have professional disputes. This
situation arises where scientific authority has been disturbed by new
discoveries and practitioners operate in separate universes. Here, the
three wise men, 40 a peer review panel of physicians, and a panel
representing different professions, will arrive at opinions that differ in
their factual findings, reliability and in the degree of consensus.
Obviously, in the absence of professional agreement, the reason for
granting the expert witness exception to the hearsay rules is no longer
justified. The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed this situation by
formulating the Daubert standard.
Andrew Grove 4' has explained how a scientifically educated
professional decisionmaker can successfully resolve disagreement
among professionals. When Grove was diagnosed with prostate cancer
and discovered that he could not obtain reliable advice from his doctors,
he used his experience as CEO of Intel corporation to cut through the
bias and puffery of the rivaling medical specialists; he used his skill as
a Ph.D. in physics to test the trustworthiness of medical opinions, and
he conducted his own, independent investigation of the medical
literature to fill in gaps. This allowed him not only to adjudicate
medical issues, but to arrived at a knowledge level that exceeded the
knowledge of his doctors.
This form of decision making requires an active investigation of
facts and laws that rule the universe of the various practitioners. This
type of investigation is commonly conducted by federal regulatory
agencies. It is also used by judges in civil law countries where judges
1 When this type of case fails to settle, the disagreement is not intrinsic in science, but in
the fact that the science favors one party, and thus the other party has a vested interest in
denigrating science and diminishing its importance relative to other issues.
"o S. Branded, Three Wise Men Procedure is Effective, 308 BRIT. MED. J. 1641, (June 18,
1994).
"I' Grove & McLean, supra note 52, at 56.
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conduct their own investigations. However, this procedure is contrary
to our adversary legal system. Our adversarial system is capable of
achieving the same result by pre-trial discovery. With Daubert, the
Supreme Court has helped refining the criteria for this endeavor.
The problem with the decision making of Grove and Daubert is that
both require not only a basic scientific education, but experience with
scientific problem solving. 42 The results obtained with Daubert during
the past three years have shown that many judges lack the tools to
recognize and analyze scientific issues. Because the level of scientific
competence of counsel and judges is not tested or standardized, and
each judge brings his own level of competence to the courtroom, the
Daubert results are intrinsically uneven and unpredictable. This
interferes with rational decision making. Furthermore, the lack of
competence triggers the Peter principle, and leads to judicial ineffi-
ciency.143 Worst of all, it makes judges look helpless in front ofjuries'l
and undermines the authority of the court.
Daubert has reduced some of the problem of embarrassment by
moving scientific decision making outside of the view ofjuries, but this
procedure impedes the balancing of scientific evidence against other
evidence,'45 and reduces public access to scientific decision making.
It is widely suggested that the evaluation of scientific evidence
should be left to neutral, court-appointed experts. However, the
appointment of party-neutral experts and panels does not solve the
problem where the primary issue is not bias towards litigating parties,
but professional disagreement.
"' Considering that our courts decide questions of great scientific and societal importance,
one can argue that there should be room in the corps of federal judges for individuals with
extensive professional experience in science as well as in law.
,' See, e.g., Hall v. Baxter, 947 F. Supp. 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1923). This opinion has 25 head
notes and 89 pages devoted to the admissibility of expert testimony, without arriving at a final
decision.
'" The importance of validated identities of the actors in legal proceedings has been
extensively discussed. See, e.g., J. BURGOON ET AL., NONVERBAL BEHAVIORS, PERSUASION, AND
CREDIBILITY (1990); ERVINO GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
DRAGAN MILOVANOVIC, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1988); Michael Saks, The Social Psychology of
Decision-Making in the Criminal Justice System, in 6 WINDSOR YEARBOOK OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE,
61-92 (1986); AUSTIN SARAT, AUTHORITY, ANXIETY, AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: MOVING FROM
SCIENTIFIC DETACHMENT TO CRITICAL INVOLVEMENT (1993); C. Visher, Juror Decision Making,
II L. & HUM. BEHAV., 1-17 (1987), and D. Wegner et al., Incrimination Through Innuendo: Can
Media Questions Become Public Answers? 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH., 822-32 (1981).
"' EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL xii-iv (NIH Research
Report Published June 1996).
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The use of scientiic panels introduces other difficulties. Specialists
lack experience in interdisciplinary communications. They constitute an
extra-legal tribunal, using extra-legal procedures, substituting profes-
sional ethics 146 for legal standards, 47and their proceedings are insuffi-
ciently open and public. 4 Furthermore, the intermediaries which the
court needs to select panel members are usually professional organiza-
tions that have their own professional and political agendas. 49 Finally,
in the large number of cases where the knowledge resides within the
defendant industry, the panel either lacks competence, or consists of
employees of, consultants to, or trade associations representing the
defendants.
Another shortcoming of Federal Rule of Evidence 706 and
scientific panels is that the scientific information is filtered before it
reaches the court and jury. They will see only a one-dimensional, rather
two or multi-dimensional picture as should be the case in the adversarial
process. This means that judges and jurors are yet more dependent on
exterior factors in judging the expert's opinion, such as professional
authority among certain groups, or his skill at self-presentation. 5 '
Other intrinsic reasons why the use of panels and non-neutrals may
be inadequate to obtain a uniform national answer to toxic causation
issues are: First, since medical standards are determined by state
licensing boards, and since these standards vary locally and among
specialists, it seems intrinsically impossible to obtain a uniform national
answers to several important questions, such as whether a certain pattern
of symptoms constitutes a disease or not. 5'
Second, causation involves medical definition of diseases, defini-
tions which involve a mix of medical, political and economic consider-
ations. It is questionable whether the courts should use their highly
sophisticated and strict evidentiary protocols to give unwarranted
'" The problem with professional ethics is that it is "a scheme of law enforcement... by
private policemen where privately declared laws are punished by penalties imposed by private
'judges' after privately conducted trials." Adv. Op. Dig. 128 (1967-70) TRADE REG. RPTFR 17950,
at 20,329 (FTC 1967).
1' This problem is discussed in Fashion Originator's Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312
U.S. 457 (1941).
141 The requirements for open proceedings is not only necessary for legal, but also for
scientific reasons. Kantrowitz, supra, note 6.
149 See supra, notes 38, 39 and 84.
"So ERVIN GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE NEW YORK 208-238
(1959).
s ' The effort to find national answers to legal questions is also counter to the present
legislative trend to shift responsibility for environmental and criminal issues to the states.
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scientific and legal credibility to an issue that might not only determine
the outcome of an individual case, but also the esteem of the court in the
scientific communities. Third, the use a "preponderance of evidence"
standard to determine the accuracy of technical issues goes against the
grain of scientific thinking.
5 2
In summary, this author believes that lay persons tend to confuse
scientific rivalries with scientific uncertainties. He agrees with Foster
and Imwinkelried,' 3 that the problem with expert testimony tends to be
exaggerated,'5 4 that some of the critics are more interested in controlling
the information flow between the court, or in the outcome of litigation,
than in the closure of disputes or in arriving at scientifically compatible
decisions. Furthermore the author agrees with the U.S. Department of
Justice, that separate and heightened scrutiny of scientific evidence
leads to less reliable outcomes of legal disputes. 155
In the final analysis, the major problem in the interdisciplinary
communication between science and law is due to the lack of scientific
competence, resulting in a lack of appreciation for the level of profes-
sional training and experience that is necessary to bridge the communi-
cation gap.'56 Judges lack the scientific expertise to recognize the
professional bias of those who are eager to help appoint neutral panels,
or serve on them." 7
If American business can bridge this gap, so can our courts.
Counsel and judges who deal with unsettled scientific issues must
5 Thus, physicians tend to think in thresholds. The threshold which triggers medical
intervention is not the legal standard of preponderance of evidence, but the hope for a cure.
Accordingly, when a physician is asked the standard question: "Doctor, to what degree of scientific
certainty do you believe that your diagnosis is correct," the physician might state that his diagnosis
was "probably" correct, and his client will lose, even though in reality the accuracy of his diagnosis
might have been 80%.
'53 IMWlNKELRIED, supra note 145.
1 For example, it can be argued that plaintiffs in breast implant cases do not sue because of
the actual injuries suffered, but because of the fact that breast implants tend to gradually leak a
foreign chemical of unknown safety into the body, that the victims were not adequately warned,
and that they were not asked for adequate informed consent, i.e., they experienced battery. Even
though these plaintiffs, and perhaps their surgeons, may have been the victims of fraud, the
causation issue might be used to circumvent the rules that immunize the plastic surgeons.
Similarly, in the Agent Orange case, it can be argued that chemical causation has been used as a
smoke screen to obscure the question whether veterans of the Vietnam war should receive better
compensation and health coverage.
... IMWINKFLREID, supra note 145, at xiii.
156 This is reflected in the fact that most judges don't realize that the reason why they cannot
locate suitable non-party experts is not that such experts do not exist, but because they are unable
to define the scientific issues,
15 See, e.g., Koshland, supra note 39; ACS, supra note 83.
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realize that their decision requires a thorough science education and
several years of experience solving scientific problems. A review of the
long judicial experience with medical peer review and professional
ethics courts shows that any delegation of judicial decision making to
groups which are not deputized or officers of the court, results in extra-
legal tribunals using extra-legal procedures, substituting professional
ethics"5 8 for legal standards.'59 Such a delegation invades the preroga-
tive of the judiciary, and is against public interest.
'5 See supra note 146.
'5 This problem is discussed in Fashion Originator's Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312
U.S. 457, 465 (1941).

